More about the The Muqāwama Doctrine (Arabic: عقيدة المقاومة, ʿaqīdat al-muqāwama) below the fold.
- The US military says it will begin blockading Iranian ports on Monday at 14:00 GMT, allowing ships not coming or going to Iran to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Iran’s Revolutionary Guard says the Strait of Hormuz is open for civilian vessels, but says that military ships “will be dealt with severely”.
Gulf states look for alternatives as Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed
The Iranians have denied that any US military vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz, and are threatening consequences if any military vessel attempts to do so.
‘Soon you’ll be nostalgic for $4–$5 gas,’ Iran’s Ghalibaf tells US
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament who led the country’s delegation in the Islamabad talks, has again addressed Trump’s threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.
“Enjoy the current pump figures,” he wrote on X, alongside a map showing prices at gas stations near the White House.
“With the so-called ‘blockade’, Soon you’ll be nostalgic for $4–$5 gas.”
The Muqāwama Doctrine (Arabic: عقيدة المقاومة, ʿaqīdat al-muqāwama) is a strategic and ideological framework of “persistent warfare” or “constant combat” employed by Hezbollah, Hamas, and various Iran-aligned militant groups (often collectively called the “Axis of Resistance” or Mehwar al-Muqāwama). It emphasizes prolonged, asymmetric attrition—aimed at eroding an adversary’s (primarily Israel’s) will to fight through sustained low-intensity conflict, rather than seeking conventional military victory or territorial control. Origins and DefinitionThe term was popularized in a 2006 analysis by Israeli journalist and analyst Ehud Yaari in the wake of the Second Lebanon War (2006) between Israel and Hezbollah. Yaari described it as a revival of rejectionist strategies after the failures of conventional Arab state armies in 1967 and 1973. While muqāwama literally translates to “resistance,” Yaari and the groups’ leaders frame it more precisely as the “doctrine of constant combat” or “persistent warfare.
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JIHAD
“Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Khaled Mashal explicitly defined it this way, arguing that surviving a full-scale confrontation with a superior military (like the IDF) itself constitutes a victory.
It draws from Islamist interpretations of jihad, Shi’a narratives of martyrdom (e.g., Karbala), and guerrilla/”popular war” tactics, but repurposed for non-state actors backed by Iran. It is not a single formal manifesto but a shared operational philosophy across the network, blending military tactics, ideology, media warfare, and social mobilization into a “resistance society” (mujtamaʿ al-muqāwama). Core PrinciplesAnalyses (including Yaari’s) distill the doctrine into these key tenets:
- Peace is not an option: Permanent recognition of Israel is rejected. Temporary hudna (armistice/truce) is permissible for tactical respites, but the struggle continues indefinitely.
- No need to wait for parity: Fighting does not require a conventional balance of forces; asymmetric tools (rockets, tunnels, kidnappings, civilian targeting) suffice to impose costs.
- Erosion over territory (“blood, not land”): The goal is not holding ground or decisive battles but methodically wearing down the enemy’s resolve through relentless friction, psychological operations, and bleeding resources/casualties. Victory is claimed by survival and continuation.
- Jihad as Islamic, not merely national: The fight transcends Palestinian/Lebanese nationalism, framing it as part of a broader pan-Islamic resistance against “Zionism” and U.S. influence, with Iran providing ideological, financial, and material support.
- Comprehensive alternative system: It is not just military but builds parallel governance, social services, and a “resistance culture” (education, media, martyrdom cult) to sustain the fight and legitimize the groups as defenders of the community.
- Hezbollah (Lebanon): Pioneered the doctrine against Israeli occupation in the 1980s–2000s. It integrates military (advanced rockets, anti-tank weapons, tunnels), political, and social arms. Post-2006, it reorganized in southern Lebanon for sustained attrition, viewing itself as part of Iran’s forward defense.
- Hamas (Gaza/West Bank): Explicitly adheres to it as Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement). It uses the doctrine to justify ongoing rocket fire, tunnel networks, and operations like the October 7, 2023, attack, prioritizing perpetual resistance over state-building compromises. Academic studies note its consistency even during periods of political pragmatism.
- Iran-Aligned Groups (Axis of Resistance): Iran coordinates and equips a network including Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya), Houthis in Yemen, and others. The doctrine enables “unity of fronts”—coordinated or parallel actions to stretch adversaries without direct Iranian conventional involvement. It frames these as defensive solidarity, rejecting “proxy” labels in favor of ideological alignment.