Category: Iran

IRGC warns ‘flames of war to engulf much wider area’ if US attacks Iran

The Islamic Republic is now openly declaring that it will pursue nuclear weapons and will not be deterred.

IRGC-linked Fars News is amplifying public calls for Iran to build the bomb, while the regime’s official representatives continue insisting that its nuclear program remains peaceful.

Saeed Leylaz, an economist historically associated with reformists, declared that Iran has “no choice but to become atomic.” He argued that nuclear-armed states are not attacked and that Iran now needs a nuclear shield.

His reformist background makes the message more useful. The regime can present nuclear weapons not as a hardline obsession, but as a national necessity supposedly imposed by American and Israeli attacks.

This does not yet confirm that a final order to assemble a weapon has been issued. It shows that the regime is deliberately preparing the Iranian public and testing the international response to an overt nuclear-weapons doctrine.

The timing is alarming.

The Islamic Republic’s missiles, proxies and underground facilities failed to prevent devastating attacks on its leadership, military and nuclear infrastructure. Its conventional deterrence was exposed as inadequate. Nuclear weapons are now being promoted as the shield its regional network could not provide.

The leadership change has widened the danger. Ali Khamenei’s nuclear fatwa was always politically reversible, and the new leadership has not clearly reaffirmed it as an absolute prohibition. Hardliners, parliamentarians and regime media are increasingly demanding that the doctrine be reconsidered.

Behind this public campaign is a deepening verification crisis.

Before inspectors lost effective access, Iran possessed approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. If enriched further, that could theoretically produce enough weapons-grade material for roughly ten bombs, although building deployable weapons would require additional steps.

The International Atomic Energy Agency can no longer confirm the stockpile’s current size, composition or location. It also cannot verify whether enrichment has stopped at Iran’s declared facilities.

That means the regime is publicly normalizing nuclear weapons while the international community is increasingly blind to the material and infrastructure that could produce them.

Any future agreement must be judged against this reality.

A deal limited to declared and already damaged facilities would leave the central danger intact. The Islamic Republic retains nuclear expertise, centrifuge knowledge, underground infrastructure and decades of experience concealing sensitive activities from inspectors.

It could accept restrictions at known sites, obtain sanctions relief and preserve material, equipment or parallel work elsewhere. An agreement without permanent access, complete material accounting and verification of centrifuge production would restore the regime’s finances without eliminating its nuclear option.

The dual message is deliberate.

For diplomacy, the regime says it does not seek the bomb.

For its domestic audience and its enemies, IRGC media says nuclear weapons are necessary and unavoidable.

The Islamic Republic is moving from nuclear ambiguity toward nuclear normalization. The danger is no longer confined to what may be happening underground. The regime is now building the political justification above ground.

If the uranium remains unaccounted for and inspectors remain obstructed, the world may discover that the debate over whether the Islamic Republic should build a bomb was merely cover for how far it had already progressed.

— The Iran Watcher (@TheIranWatcher) October 27, 2026

The children of killed regime leaders are revealing that secret relocations, safe houses and bodyguards all failed because U.S.-Israeli intelligence tracked their fathers through every move.

The Islamic Republic fears another decapitation campaign is coming, with its president and parliament speaker explicitly named as targets.

Regime officials spared in the first war to keep negotiations alive may not survive the next, as the United States and Israel could wipe out entire layers of the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Hamzeh Safavi, the son of former IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, warns that the next attack could expand from targeting roughly 40 senior officials to eliminating between 1,000 and 1,500 members of the regime.

He calls it the “lawnmower” strategy.

The objective would no longer be limited to removing the Islamic Republic’s highest commanders. The campaign could move systematically through the regime’s provincial IRGC commanders, intelligence officials, Basij leaders and other functionaries responsible for maintaining control across Iran.

Safavi considers this one of the most serious scenarios for the next phase of the war. Its purpose would be to paralyze the regime’s command structure and force it into absolute surrender.

This is not a confirmed American or Israeli plan. It is a warning from a regime-connected figure that reveals how vulnerable the Islamic Republic now believes its entire governing class has become.

Safavi admits that officials were caught off guard during the previous attacks. They did not believe the United States and Israel would locate and eliminate senior figures so quickly, freely and without hesitation.

The next phase he fears would scale that model dramatically.

Precision strikes could target officials as they move, meet and communicate. Cyber operations could disrupt command networks while simultaneous attacks on missile facilities and underground headquarters prevent surviving leaders from coordinating an effective response.

Safavi also warns that missile cities and command centres buried between 60 and 120 metres underground could be targeted. Such an operation would likely require American bunker-busting weapons, sustained intelligence coverage and continued air superiority over Iran.

The political calculation may also be changing.

Earlier in the conflict, some officials were reportedly spared because the United States needed interlocutors capable of negotiating. Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Abbas Araghchi retained value as channels through which a ceasefire or settlement could be reached.

The “lawnmower” scenario assumes that restraint has ended.

Instead of preserving negotiators, the next campaign could dismantle the governing layer that allows the Islamic Republic to repress unrest, mobilize loyalists and rebuild military power after every round of strikes.

Eliminating 1,000–1,500 officials would be vastly more difficult than targeting several dozen senior leaders. The regime can disperse personnel, restrict communications, move officials underground and rapidly appoint replacements. Such an operation would also risk civilian casualties, retaliation and institutional fragmentation rather than an orderly surrender.

But Safavi’s warning exposes the deeper crisis.

The Islamic Republic built its deterrence around the assumption that its leaders, underground facilities and security hierarchy were beyond the enemy’s reach. The previous war shattered that assumption.

Regime insiders are no longer debating whether senior officials can be reached. They are warning that the next campaign could move from leadership decapitation to the systematic destruction of the regime’s entire command structure.

The Islamic Republic spent decades threatening to destroy its enemies. Its own elite is now discussing how much of the regime may survive the next attack.

— The Iran Watcher (@TheIranWatcher) October 21, 2026