The key to the downfall of the Islamic Republic is when it can no longer afford to pay its repressive forces and mercenaries.
The regime has survived economic collapse and repeated nationwide uprisings because it has kept the IRGC, Basij and security apparatus paid, armed and loyal, while also relying on foreign and proxy forces during periods of severe unrest.
That is why the collapse in oil exports matters so much. The IRGC had grown to control as much as half of Iran’s oil trade, tying the regime’s most important source of revenue directly to the machinery that protects it. Iranian oil loadings have reportedly plunged from roughly 1.7–2.2 million barrels per day before the war to around 250,000 in August.
The Islamic Republic can survive an impoverished population if it can still finance repression. But when it can no longer pay the forces it depends on to crush dissent, the foundations of the regime begin to crack.
